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TOWARD AN INTEGRATED VISION OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL RIGHTS: A
COUNTER TO JUDICIAL AND
ACADEMIC NIHILISM
ALFREDO GARciA*
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over the proper scope and interpretation of criminal pro-
cedural rights has reached a sterile impasse. To a great degree, the dia-
lectic stems from the fundamental source of American criminal
procedure, the Bill of Rights. At bottom, the safeguards relating to the
criminal process embodied in the Bill of Rights are value-laden, open-
textured, and subject to divergent philosophical perspectives. Indeed,
one may find support for this viewpoint from writers of different ideo-
logical stripes. For example, Judge Richard Posner, an avowed "pragma-
tist," has acknowledged that the shifting degrees of protection for
criminal defendants' rights have no connection to "logic."' Similarly,
but more explicitly, Professor Susan Bandes argues that constitutional
interpretation and discourse is impossible "without reference to
values."2
One may test this theory by pointing to the stridency with which
scholars and jurists have assailed the propensity of both the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts to curtail criminal defendants' rights. Thus, two of the
last three remaining members of the Warren Court, Justices Thurgood
Marshall and William Brennan, decried the conservative philosophical
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; B.A. 1973,
with high honors, Jacksonville University; M.A. 1974 and J.D. 1981, University of Florida.
The author would like to thank Professors Tracey Maclin and Ellen Podgor for their com-
ments on an earlier draft.
1. RicHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENC E 54 (1990).
2. Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 2271, 2343-45
(1990).
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bent of the Rehnquist and Burger Courts before they left the bench. In
his "valedictory" dissent in Payne v. Tennessee,3 Justice Marshall accused
his brethren of relying on power, not reason, as the basis for their deci-
sions. In less dramatic fashion, Justice Brennan denounced the Court for
its exercise of a "doctrinally destructive nihilism," which lacked a coher-
ent framework and amounted to a "conceptual free-for-all."4
Echoing the attack by Justices Brennan and Marshall, scholars have
pointed to the doctrinal deficiency of the Court's criminal procedure ju-
risprudence. For example, Professor Bruce Green confirmed Justice
Marshall's critique by examining five decisions issued in the 1990 Term
that dealt with the Fourth Amendment. He found that the Court em-
ployed interpretive principle, policy, and precedent in an inconsistent
fashion to yield a restrictive construction of the Fourth Amendment in
every case.5 Coinciding with Professor Green's conclusion is Professor
Tom Stacy's analysis of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' conception of
the role of accurate adjudication in the criminal process. Stacy discov-
ered a lack of "internal" consistency and coherence in the Court's treat-
ment of the dichotomy between what he labels "truth-furthering" versus
"truth-impairing" rights. 6
Although academicians have identified and taken issue with the
Court's apparent doctrinal vacuum, they have contributed to the void by
taking a shortsighted view of the values and purposes underlying the Bill
of Rights. Rather than analyzing the criminal provisions of the Bill of
Rights as an organic whole serving mutually complementary values,
scholars have treated them as disjointed entities. The tendency of crimi-
nal specialists is to examine and analyze separate facets of the Bill of
Rights, such as the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, as dis-
tinct commodities rather than as a unified structure. Thus, "academic
determinism" has facilitated the division of the Bill of Rights and
3. 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619-25 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 357-70 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan took issue with the majority's interpretation of the scope of the Fourth Amendment's
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures in a school setting. In discarding the
probable cause standard, the majority held that neither the warrant nor the probable cause
provisions of the Fourth Amendment applied to school officials who conducted searches and
seizures to maintain school discipline. Rather, the majority replaced the probable cause stan-
dard with a reasonableness criterion. The majority's rationale was based on a balancing test
that weighed the privacy of the student against the need of school authorities to maintain
order and discipline. Id. at 340-43.
5. Bruce A. Green, "Power, Not Reason": Justice Marshall's Valedictory and the Fourth
Amendment in the Supreme Court's 1990 Term, 70 N.C. L. REv. 373 (1992).
6. Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM.
L. REv. 1369, 1370-71 (1991).
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thereby reinforced the doctrinal drift of the Court's criminal procedure
jurisprudence. 7
In my work on the Sixth Amendment, I have joined the chorus of
judicial and academic carping at the lack of doctrinal consistency and the
result-driven nature of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' interpretation
of the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights.8 To a large extent, there-
fore, I have contributed to a debate that, perhaps, is rapidly becoming
stale. As an antidote to this staleness, I wish to elevate the level of the
dialogue by offering an interpretive synthesis grounded upon the essen-
tial values underlying the four amendments in the Bill of Rights that
provide the foundation for the criminal adversarial process. My aim is to
steer the debate to a more fruitful plane by proposing an overarching
theory that serves as a counter to judicial and academic nihilism.
The first step in the process is to identify the common values that are
fostered by the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights from both a his-
torical and a modem standpoint. The second phase is to determine how
these values have been interpreted and assessed by both the Court and
scholars in specific contexts. The last stage is to critique the improvident
fashion with which the Court and scholars have interpreted criminal pro-
cedural rights and to offer an alternative view.
II. COMMON VALUES AND THE CPIM NAL AMENDMENTS
An analysis of the origins and development of the criminal provisions
contained in the Bill of Rights reveals several discrete, yet common and
mutually complementary, norms. These values inhere in all four amend-
ments relating to the criminal process. Although the amendments differ
in the extent to which any specific norm predominates, all of them share
the same standards. The values pervading the criminal provisions of the
Bill of Rights are both substantive and procedural; they protect the invi-
olability of individual autonomy, while safeguarding against government
abuse of power and ensuring the fair play norms that support the adver-
sary system of adjudication.
In the context of assessing the reach of the Fifth Amendment, the
Court has characterized these values as the "societal interests in privacy,
fairness, and restraint of governmental power."9 Structurally, the interest
7. In an incisive article, Howard W. Gutman recognized this phenomenon and explained
its development. See Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of
Rights, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 295 (1981).
8. See ALEREDO GARCrA, THE SIXm AMENDMENT IN MODERN AiMRIcAN JURISPRU-
DENCE: A CI~rncAL PERsPEcrrvE (1992).
9. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 n.11 (1988).
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in privacy may be characterized as a substantive right that promotes
human and moral autonomy. Inextricably linked to this substantive
value are the two procedural, but analogous, "interests" in freedom from
governmental overreaching and adherence to fair play.10 Although the
Court has identified these norms in the process of analyzing the funda-
mental policies underlying the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination
clause, it has failed to apply them consistently and organically while de-
termining the scope of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.
This shortcoming has led both the Burger and Rehnquist Courts to a
seemingly "nihilistic" path, which has become the subject of critical
commentary.
Criticism of the Court's doctrinal abyss has been ineffective because
it has failed to take a more holistic approach based on the common val-
ues fostered by the Bill of Rights. Two attempts have been made to view
the Bill of Rights as an organic document, rather than as a series of dis-
crete objects. In a path-breaking work, Howard Gutman pointed to the
misplaced division of the Bill of Rights as he argued that the division
stemmed largely from "academic determinism."" Indeed, before Gut-
man's incisive essay, the only substantive work treating the Bill of Rights
as an organic document was Edward Dumbauld's The Bill of Rights and
What it Means Today, 2 published in 1957. In a recent piece, Professor
Aktil R. Amar has provided a sweeping reinterpretation of the Bill of
Rights from a structural perspective.' 3
Elaborating upon the thematic edifice furnished by Gutman and
Amar, I will illustrate how the dismembering of the criminal provisions
of the Bill of Rights has yielded a sterile jurisprudence and a jaundiced
academic view of the criminal process. The failure of the Court and
academia to offer a more complete approach stems from their lack of
emphasis on the commonality of values underlying the criminal amend-
ments and their failure to identify and apply those values. Having iden-
tified those fundamental norms,' 4 the task at hand is to elucidate their
10. Peter Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reap-
praisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 37 (1982). Professor Arenella makes this distinction in the
process of identifying common values underlying the Fifth Amendment proscription against
self-incrimination.
11. See generally Gutman, supra note 7.
12. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY (1957).
13. Aktil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131 (1991). Pro-
fessor Amar downplays the countermajoritarian aspects of the Bill of Rights and instead em-
phasizes its "empowering" of majorities against a venal government.
14. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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historical and doctrinal significance and to see how their lack of applica-
tion, or misapplication, has borne meager results.
A. Historical Foundations and the Bill of Rights
Americans derived their concept of freedom and liberty from a dis-
tinguished English historical and legal foundation. Liberty was a recip-
rocal term that connoted both protection from the excesses of one's
fellow men, as well as protection from the power of government. In ef-
fect, liberty was a plural term that "consisted in limitations upon the
power of the sovereign and in a sharing, enjoyed by freemen, in the exer-
cise of those powers."15 Transplanted to the shores of the New World,
the colonists jealously preserved their freedoms by enacting charters that
safeguarded personal rights. Thus, the Massachusetts Bay Colony
promulgated the first comprehensive statement of personal rights in
1641. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties included protections against
cruel and unusual punishments, provided for the right of habeas corpus,
allowed the accused the right to counsel as long as the defendant did not
pay for his lawyer's services, and guaranteed a jury trial.1 6
Colonial grievances that launched the severance from England were
in large part prompted by violation of what colonists viewed as the quin-
tessential democratic institution of the jury trial. The Stamp Act of 1765
subverted the jury trial through resort to vice-admiralty courts, which
determined violations without juries.'7 As the movement toward inde-
pendence gained momentum, a declaration of rights became a focus of
dissatisfaction, culminating in the Continental Congress's approval of a
"Declaration of Rights" in 1774. That document emphasized the right to
"the common law of England, and more especially, to the great and ines-
timable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according
to the course of that law."' 8
The most exhaustive revolutionary catalogue of rights was the Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights, drafted by George Mason on the eve of the
Declaration of Independence. This document foreshadowed both the
Constitution and the Federal Bill of Rights. Containing sixteen articles,
the Virginia Declaration devoted nine articles to the principles of repub-
lican government and seven to a list of individual rights. Those rights
15. FORREST MACDONALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM: THE INTELLECrUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 36-37 (1985).
16. DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN His-
TORY 15-16 (1992); ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14-16 (1955).
17. BODENHAMER, supra note 16, at 33; RuTLAD, supra note 16, at 24-25.
18. RuTLAND, supra note 16, at 26-27.
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included the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, the right
against self-incrimination, a prohibition against excessive fines and cruel
and unusual punishment, and the right to a speedy trial and an impartial
jury. Because Virginia was the first state to draft such a comprehensive
document, its Declaration of Rights "expanded the conception of per-
sonal rights of citizens as no other document before its adoption had
done."' 9 Paving the way for the rest of the states, Virginia's bold decla-
ration was copied by most other states. By 1787, the citizens of the new
republic could rest comfortably as their personal liberties were pre-
served from arbitrary government and irrational impulse through written
bills of rights.20 Paralleling the development of analogous rights in Eng-
land, a "formidable array of liberties" to protect the citizen against the
sovereign had become entrenched in both England and America by the
late eighteenth century.2' Those liberties included the criminal safe-
guards embodied in the Bill of Rights: the right to a fair trial, freedom
from arbitrary governmental oppression, and the right to the inviolabil-
ity of the human personality. 2
Given the widespread protection of rights by state governments, it is
not surprising that a bill of rights received scant attention in the Philadel-
phia Convention of 1787. As a prominent historian of the Bill of Rights
has remarked, by the time of the Convention, "[s]atisfaction among the
public regarding personal rights was established. Thus neither [George]
Mason nor his colleagues at Philadelphia found it necessary to come into
the convention hall ready to serve as watchdogs for civil liberty."' Ulti-
mately, the debate over the need for a federal bill of rights became a
part of the attempt by the Antifederalists to rein in what they perceived
as the broad powers granted to the new federal government through the
Constitution.
The principal argument marshalled by the Federalists against a bill of
rights was that it was "irrelevant." It was irrelevant for two reasons:
First, it constituted a mere "paper check" that could be and had been
violated repeatedly by the states; second, and more important, the peo-
ple had vested plenary power in their state governments while expressly
limiting the federal government's power.24 To the extent the people re-
19. Id. at 38-40.
20. 1d. at 41-100.
21. MACDONALD, supra note 15, at 38-39.
22. Id.
23. RUTLAND, supra note 16, at 108.
24. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERCAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 536-42
(1969).
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tained power not specified in the Constitution, an explicit declaration of
rights was superfluous.
Though this contention seemingly blunted the Antifederalist objec-
tion to the concentration of power in the hands of the new federal gov-
ernment, it failed to carry the day. Rather, the momentum for a federal
bill of rights became irrepressible. The Antifederalists, who were not as
concerned with personal liberty as they were with curbing the power of
the federal government, gained a "Pyrrhic" victory. In effect, the Anti-
federalists saw the "strongest of their objections" to the Constitution
"turned against them."5
B. Functions of the Bill of Rights
The irony behind the passage of the Bill of Rights raises a fundamen-
tal issue: What did the Framers envision as the objective to be served by
a catalogue of guarantees embodied within the Constitution? Thomas
Jefferson provided the philosophical impetus for a bill of rights, which he
saw as an indispensable element of a free society. In a letter to James
Madison, who was not enthusiastic about the need for a bill of rights,
Jefferson wrote that "a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to
against every government on earth, general or particular, & what no just
government should refuse, or rest on inference. '26 What Jefferson's re-
marks betrayed was a distrust of centralized governmental power. This
concern was heightened because state bills of rights could not furnish
protection against the federal government 2
Madison ultimately became convinced of the necessity and wisdom
of having a federal bill of rights for two essential reasons. First, he be-
lieved that such an instrument might serve as a check against
majoritarian impulses. Second, Madison considered "the possibility that
the arbitrary acts of the government, rather than oppressive majorities,
might invade citizens' rights."'  A third rationale, closely connected to
the fear of oppressive majorities, was the didactic purpose served by a
declaration of fundamental rights.2 9 The notion underlying the Federal
25. Id. at 543.
26. DuMBAutD, supra note 12, at 8-9 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 5 THE WoRKs OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 371 (Paul L. Ford ed.,
1904)).
27. RUTLAND, supra note 16, at 197.
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); RuTr-
LAND, supra note 16, at 193.
29. DumBAULD, supra note 12, at 8; LEONARD LEVY, ORmGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAM-
ERS' CONSTTUON 146 (1988).
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Bill of Rights, therefore, was not only countermajoritarian but also
majoritarian in the sense that it protected the citizenry against the poten-
tial abuse of power by the federal government.3 0
Within the context of the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights,
one may discern both majoritarian and antimajoritarian objectives. The
concern over protection of criminal defendants' rights against the poten-
tially overwhelming power of the federal government no doubt played a
role in the forging of the criminal safeguards contained in the Bill of
Rights. The experience of the colonials taught them that the govern-
ment could deprive the majority of basic freedoms. In this respect, the
Fourth Amendment was drafted in reaction to the abuses of the British
government in relying on general warrants to invade the privacy of the
home. These warrants, known as writs of assistance, gave officials un-
trammeled authority to search for goods imported in violation of the
British tax laws. Providing the spark for the revolution, the warrants
were described by James Otis in 1761 as "the worst instrument of arbi-
trary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book."'"
Similarly, the right to counsel and the other trial-related rights em-
bodied in the Sixth Amendment emerged as a counter to the tremen-
dous power exercised by the public prosecutor. 2 More important, the
right to a jury trial signified America's ratification of participatory de-
mocracy.33 Together with the grand jury, guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment, both the criminal and the civil jury served dual functions:
They safeguarded against governmental overreaching and ensured polit-
ical participation by the populace. In short, the jury was the quintessen-
tial majoritarian device that enshrined "the ideals of populism,
federalism, and civic virtue that were the essence of the original Bill of
Rights. ,34
30. See generally Amar, supra note 13. Professor Amar contends that the primary aim of
the Bill of Rights was not to safeguard minority rights, but rather to allow state and local
governments to detect and prevent "federal abuse," to ensure citizen participation in federal
administration of justice, and to maintain the right of the majority to "alter or abolish govern-
ment and thereby pronounce the last word on constitutional questions." Id. at 1133.
31. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965). As Professor Amar points out, the Fourth
Amendment may be seen as an attempt to protect the people from "self-interested govern-
ment policy" rather than as an instrument for "protecting minorities against majorities of fel-
low Citizens." Amar, supra note 13, at 1177-80.
32. GARCIA, supra note 8, at 4.
33. Id. at 183.
34. Amar, supra note 13, at 1183-90.
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At the same time, antimajoritarian strains permeate the four amend-
ments dealing with the criminal process. The history of the Fourth
Amendment, for example, is linked to the attempt by the British govern-
ment to stifle and destroy dissent? 5 Likewise, the Fifth Amendment's
Self-Incrimination Clause and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment reflect solicitude for the rights of
minorities against oppressive majorities. The Sixth Amendment, which
undergirds the criminal adversary system of adjudication, provides a
shield for the defendant against the formidable resources at the govern-
ment's disposal. 6
In similar fashion, the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights incor-
porate negative restraints on governmental action and correlative posi-
tive duties imposed on officials. Although the Fourth Amendment
forbids unreasonable searches and seizures, it also requires officials to
secure warrants based on probable cause. The Fifth Amendment's pro-
scription against compelled self-incrimination has been construed to re-
quire prophylactic warnings before a suspect is questioned. 7 In
addition, while the Sixth Amendment compels the government to fur-
nish the accused with such fundamental rights to a fair trial as the assist-
ance of counsel, a jury of her peers, confrontation, and compulsory
process,38 it also implicitly condemns a trial lacking such rudiments.
Discerning the political and philosophical foundations of the Bill of
Rights is a treacherous enterprise. Nevertheless, it is possible to extract
majoritarian as well as countermajoritarian values from the list of rights
accorded to criminal defendants. Though couched in both negative and
positive terms, the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights can properly
be interpreted as constraints on governmental power as well as positive
commands to afford the accused fundamental protections against unbri-
dled governmental power that threaten her liberty and dignitary
interests.
C. The Values Underlying Criminal Safeguards
The purposes served by a federal bill of rights, as we have seen, re-
veal a common thread. They both constrain the government and em-
35. Stanford, 379 U.S. at 482.
36. See generally GARCIA, supra note 8.
37. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The point that the Constitution embraces
both positive as well as negative requirements has been persuasively made by Professor Susan
Bandes. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 2282-83 (stating that Fourth and Fifth Amendments
embody positive and negative commands).
38. Bandes, supra note 2, at 2276.
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power the majority against governmental abuse. These values are
reflected in the stipulations in the Bill of Rights governing the criminal
process. A substantial portion of the first ten amendments to the Consti-
tution involve the criminal adjudicatory system. Indeed, as one scholar
notes, "[t]he federal Bill of Rights devotes more attention to the require-
ments for a fair criminal process than it does to any other right or group
of rights."39 The puzzling aspect of this cluster of related guarantees is
that few attempts have been made to connect them. Though this cluster
of rights shares common values, these concepts have not been linked in a
consistent manner.
On several occasions, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the interest in human autonomy, dignity, and privacy underlie
the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. In Boyd v. United States,' the
Court acknowledged the vital link between the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments. The right to personal security, liberty, and private property safe-
guarded by the Fourth Amendment was coterminous with the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against "forcible and compulsory extortion of
a man's own testimony."'" In other words, the right to human dignity,
freedom, and security was a substantive right common to both
amendments.
Justice Douglas saw the bond among the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments in his dissenting opinion in Frank v. Maryland.42 He
viewed the amendments as guarantors not only of privacy and freedom
from self-incrimination, but also as protectors of "conscience and human
dignity and freedom of expression as well."'43 Ultimately, Justice Doug-
las's minority position would portend his tour-de-force in the landmark
case of Griswold v. Connecticut.'
In Griswold, Douglas implied a penumbral "zone" of privacy in the
First Amendment. In essence, this "zone" derived from a citizen's right
to freedom from governmental intrusion in that citizen's intimate affairs.
Justice Douglas bolstered his rationale through reference to the right to
privacy inherent in the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against self-incrimination.45 In this seminal case, therefore, Justice
39. BODENHAMER, supra note 16, at 5.
40. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
41. Id. at 630.
42. 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 376 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
44. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45. I. at 483-85.
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Douglas provided a conceptual framework for assessing the values in-
trinsic to the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights.
From a historical standpoint, the Douglas opinion stood on solid
ground. The radical Whig tradition, which provided the ideological un-
derpinnings of the American Revolution, placed a premium on the pres-
ervation of liberty. This liberty was simultaneously personal and
communal. As Gordon Wood notes in his magisterial work on the
American republic, Whig viewed public liberty as the combination of
"each man's individual liberty into a collective governmental authority,"
which yielded "the institutionalization of the people's personal lib-
erty."46 More important, the liberty held jointly by the populace consti-
tuted the essential obstacle against arbitrary power. "Free" people were
characterized by their ability to exercise a constitutional "check" on gov-
ernmental oppression.47 Individual autonomy, therefore, meant not only
personal dignity, privacy, and moral autonomy, but also freedom from
governmental abuse.
Given the nexus between the purposes served by the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, it is possible to see the emphasis on the substantive
value of human dignity that underlies both amendments. But if the two
amendments stress this value, they also jealously guard the freedom of
the individual from oppressive state interference. Thus, Justice Field,
condemning the "cruelty" of compelling someone to confess his guilt,
defended the privilege against self-incrimination as the "result of the
long struggle between the opposing forces of the spirit of individual lib-
erty on the one hand and the collective power of the State on the
other."4" Accentuating the potential abuses posed by uncontrolled
searches and seizures, Justice Jackson justified the application of the ex-
clusionary rule as a way of "extending protection against the central gov-
ernment's agencies."4 9  Individual liberty and freedom from
governmental oppression, therefore, are obverse sides of the same coin;
one is critical to the preservation of the other.
The remaining two criminal provisions of the Fifth Amendment, the
right to a grand jury indictment for a serious crime and the protection
46. WOOD, supra note 24, at 21-25; see also MAcDONALD, supra note 15, at 70-71. Be-
cause promotion of the public good was the goal of republican government, minority rights
were an anomaly for the American Whigs. In the Whig conception, majority tyranny was
"theoretically inconceivable, because the power held by the people was liberty." WOOD,
supra note 24, at 62.
47. WOOD, supra note 24, at 25.
48. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting).
49. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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against double jeopardy, also combine protection for individual auton-
omy with safeguards against governmental excesses. A grand jury indict-
ment must be founded on substantial evidence against the accused,
which is proved by witnesses other than the defendant. This require-
ment dovetails with the privilege against self-incrimination by requiring
the government to establish proof of a crime through evidence in-
dependent of the accused's statements.50 Additionally, the prohibition
against double jeopardy secures individual autonomy against unwar-
ranted state domination by preserving the finality of either a jury's or a
court's judgment and preventing reprosecution for the same offense.5'
Of course, the Eighth Amendment's proscription against excessive
fines or bail and cruel and unusual punishment represents the ultimate
glorification of individual dignitary interests against the state's monopoly
on the application of force. Together with the prohibition against self-
incrimination, this amendment embodies the notion that even the "evil
man" is a human being who must be accorded the fundamental decency
that comports with a civilized society.5" Indeed, both the Fifth and the
Eighth Amendments run into each other in the sense of championing
human autonomy against the collective power of the state.
Although the Sixth Amendment implements fair play values essential
to the proper functioning of the American adversary process, it also un-
derscores human autonomy as a central tenet of the adversary system.
The fulcrum of the criminal adversary system is the right to counsel,
which gives the defendant a measure of autonomy through an attorney
who is the accused's "champion against a hostile world."53 Taking au-
tonomy to its outer limits, the United States Supreme Court relied on
history in holding that an attorney may not represent a criminal defend-
ant against his or her wishes; rather, the defendant may opt, when prop-
erly advised of the consequences, to engage in self-representation.
Indeed, in Faretta v. California,54 the Court left no doubt that the pri-
macy of the individual is the hallmark of the American criminal adver-
sary system.55
50. DUMBAULD, supra note 12, at 78 n.2.
51. See generally JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL
AND SOCIAL POLICY (1969); George C. Thomas, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988
U. ILL. L. REv. 827.
52. See ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7-8 (1955).
53. See GARCIA, supra note 8, at 40-45.
54. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
55. Id. at 834; GARCIA, supra note 8, at 41. Professor Toni Massaro contends that the
Confrontation Clause also fosters dignitary values. Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of
Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 863 (1988).
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Other facets of the Sixth Amendment provide a buffer against the
power wielded by the government. For example, the paradigmatic right
to a jury trial interposes the common sense judgment of the community
as a shield against the overzealous prosecutor or the corrupt judge. 6 To
the extent that the Sixth Amendment affords the criminal defendant the
means to combat the resources and strength of the prosecution, it fur-
nishes a crucial check upon the "awesome" power of the government. 7
Therefore, the Sixth Amendment embodies the complementary values
of human autonomy and protection from governmental overreaching.
Closely related to the restriction on governmental overreaching are
the fair play norms that underlie the criminal adversary system. Because
the Sixth Amendment safeguards a defendant's right to a fair trial, it
signifies a commitment to a modicum of equality in which a defendant is
given a chance to contest charges that may result in the deprivation of
liberty. The Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination also
recognizes that fair play requires the government to amass evidence
against the accused without having to extract it from him or her. More-
over, the requirement of a grand jury indictment also obligates the pros-
ecution to develop its case without the defendant's assistance. To a large
extent, these provisions of the Bill of Rights are "designed to redress the
advantage that inheres in a government prosecution. 58
Further, it is possible to discern fair play motives behind the Fourth
Amendment. Historically, the use of warrants to authorize searches or
seizures was limited. This limitation stemmed from the fact that juries
traditionally determined the reasonableness of a search or seizure in a
trespass action. Judicial warrants were restricted, therefore, because
they usurped the jury's function in assessing the propriety of searches
and seizures.5 9 Consequently, the Fourth Amendment served as a bul-
wark against governmental overreaching by allowing a jury, rather than
a magistrate, to sanction governmental excesses and thus to foster
fairness.
In sum, the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights advance three
core values: human autonomy, fairness, and freedom from government
overreaching. These values are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are
complementary and represent the crux of the Bill of Rights: a check by
the judiciary on governmental power as a means of preserving the peo-
56. See, eg., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,100 (1970); GARCIA, supra note 8, at 183-84.
57. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
58. 1&
59. Amar, supra note 13, at 1178-79.
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pie's liberties. 60 It is critical, therefore, to delve into the ability of the
Court to apply these values in a consistent, logical manner.
III. APPLICATION OF THE VALUES UNDERLYING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS
The breadth and complexity of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights precludes an exhaustive
analysis of its jurisprudence. Nevertheless, three areas reveal the
Court's doctrinal predilection and its direction in applying the values un-
derlying the criminal amendments. The most controversial sphere of
criminal jurisprudence is the development and scope of the exclusionary
rule. Because the rule has been extended to the states6' and applies
across the range of criminal amendments,62 it serves as a heuristic device
when one examines the Court's jurisprudence. Particularly, the means
by which the Court has constrained the rule's effect deserve close scru-
tiny. In addition, the way the Court has employed and construed "pro-
phylactic" rules,63 which are designed to avert constitutional violations,
evokes its value judgment regarding the norms pervading the Bill of
Rights. Finally, the Court's resolution of cases involving potential multi-
ple constitutional violations yields rich avenues for analysis.
A. Development and Justification for the Exclusionary Remedy
Shrouded in controversy, the exclusionary rule elicits passionate dis-
course about the wisdom of barring probative evidence in the criminal
process. This discourse reflects the tension between the values underly-
ing the criminal safeguards enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Although
60. WOOD, supra note 24, at 543.
61. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The rule was initially applied by the Court to a
Fourth Amendment violation in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
62. The rule is applicable to Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment violations. See United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-39 (1967) (excluding identification by witness because post-
indictment lineup was conducted without counsel in violation of Sixth Amendment); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
applies to states and applying same standard of admissibility of confessions decreed by Brain
v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897)); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-07 (1964)
(excluding statements deliberately elicited by government agent after the defendant had been
indicted and secured counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-43
(holding that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination bars the use of involuntary
confessions in federal court).
63. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 81-83
(2d ed. 1992). Succinctly defined, a "prophylactic" rule "imposes a preventive safeguard that
may reach beyond the presence of an actual constitutional violation." Id at 81.
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the rule is a relatively modem phenomenon, 64 it underscores the funda-
mental link between constitutional imperatives and the proper means to
enforce those norms. Since constitutional norms are not self-enforcing,
the means by which the values inherent in the criminal amendments are
implemented says much about the judiciary's role as the arbiter of the
Constitution.
When the Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary remedy to
the federal government in Weeks v. United States,6' the members of the
Court could not have foreseen the conflict that the rule would create.
Indeed, the categorical fashion in which the rule was expounded sup-
ports this conclusion. An analysis of Weeks, moreover, reveals the tie
between individual liberties, governmental excesses, and fair play
standards.
Acknowledging the interrelationship between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments in advancing individual autonomy, the Weeks Court also
recognized that autonomy was linked to the ability of the individual to
prevent unbridled governmental discretion.6 Consequently, the Fourth
Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures
promotes dual norms: autonomy and protection against governmental
overreaching. 67 The Court, therefore, viewed the Amendment as serv-
ing, in Professor Amsterdam's succinct words, both an "atomistic" and a
"regulatory" function.68
Implicit in the Weeks opinion is the notion that fair play criteria mili-
tate against the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Jus-
tice Day, writing for the Court, observed that law enforcement agents
should not secure convictions through unlawful searches or seizures or
coerced confessions. As he put it, such practices "should find no sanc-
tion in the judgment of the courts which are charged at all times with the
support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a
right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights."69
Having linked the core values underlying both the Fourth and the
Fifth Amendments, the Weeks Court further stated in forceful terms the
64. The rule was first enunciated in the twentieth century in Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914).
65. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
66. Id. at 391-92.
67. Id. at 392.
68. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MnN. L. RIv.
349, 367 (1974). Professor Amsterdam concludes that an "atomistic" view of the Fourth
Amendment is "too narrow" and that the Constitution "commands" the exclusionary remedy
in order to avoid unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 432-33.
69. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
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necessity for an enforcement mechanism to secure those rights. Without
the exclusionary sanction, the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment
would become hollow prescriptions. In fact, Justice Day stated that if
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is admitted in
a criminal trial, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
"might as well be stricken from the Constitution. 70
However categorical the Weeks Court's prescription might have ap-
peared, a debate ensued regarding the basis for the exclusionary rule.
The debate centered on whether the rule was constitutionally derived or
a mere prophylactic device "designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect. ' 71 Concluding that the rule
was a "judicially created" remedy, the Court in United States v. Calan-
dra72 sought to circumscribe the effects of a putatively costly sanction.73
The problem with the Calandra approach and the debate over whether
the exclusionary sanction has constitutional roots is that it views the
Fourth Amendment from a monolithic perspective.
Perhaps the best argument for the restriction of the exclusionary
sanction is based on the notion that the sole value the Fourth Amend-
ment fosters is individual privacy. Consequently, the nexus "between
the wrong of the search and a subsequent official proceeding will remain
somewhat mystical. ' 74 To the degree that one's privacy has been vio-
lated, it is indefensible to contend that suppression of the discovered
evidence will further buttress privacy rights.75
Moreover, the defense of exclusion on the basis of its deterrent effect
suffers from similar logical and empirical flaws. The deterrence rationale
presupposes that police officers know what conduct is constitutionally
proscribed and that they will not engage in such behavior. Unfortu-
70. Id. at 393.
71. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
72. Id. at 347-48.
73. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court acknowledged the lack of an
empirical basis for the proposition that exclusion substantially hampered the rate of convic-
tions. Nevertheless, the Court resorted to the dubious proposition that the small rate of con-
victions lost on account of exclusion obscured "a large absolute number of felons who are
released because the cases against them were based in part on illegal searches or seizures." Id&
at 907-08 n.6 (citations omitted).
74. Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE LJ. 906, 919 (1986). This is the argument
set forth by the majority in Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354. A similar proposition was advanced by
the Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965), when it refused to retroactively
apply Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states).
75. Dripps, supra note 74, at 920-21. Professor Dripps notes that the essence of the viola-
tion occurs when one's privacy is exposed to the police and to others, not when criminal evi-
dence is discovered.
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nately, research suggests that neither of these propositions is empirically
sound.7 6 In fact, if deterrence is the only justification for the exclusion-
ary remedy, then its viability is severely undermined. Because the
Supreme Court has embraced the deterrent rationale as the only founda-
tion for the rule,77 it ought to acknowledge the obvious and dispense
with the rule.
Rather than focusing on this narrow vista, one must explore the criti-
cal values behind the Fourth Amendment specifically, and all of the
criminal amendments in general. Justice Frankfurter aptly summed up
the "core" concern of the Fourth Amendment as "[t]he security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police. '78  As we have seen,
however, the criminal amendments promote not only individual auton-
omy and principles of fair play, but also collective protection against ar-
bitrary police behavior. Simply looking at the privacy part of the
equation leaves gaping holes in the justification, or lack thereof, for the
exclusionary rule.
From this broad vantage point, the exclusionary sanction is defensi-
ble because it furthers the "principle '79 that the government ought not
to profit from its own lawlessness.8 0 Symbolically, the criminal amend-
ments imply that "[d]ecency, security, and liberty alike demand that gov-
ernment officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen."'s8 Although not all law enforcement officials
will adhere faithfully to constitutional commands, or know about such
imperatives, democratic "fair process norms" preclude the government
from profiting from its own wrongs. The implication to a democratic
76. See generally William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MicsI.
J.L. REF. 311 (1991).
77. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 916-17; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48.
78. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
79. I use "principle" here as defined by Ronald Dworkin: A principle is a "standard that
is to be observed... because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension
of morality." RoNALD DwoRKiN, TAXiNG RIGH-rS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977).
80. The California Supreme Court adhered to this principle in People v. Martin, 290 P.2d
855 (Cal. 1955), abrogated by CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(d), as stated in People v. Dann, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 228 (Ct. App. 1984). As the Court stated, the defendant's "right to object to the use of
the evidence must rest, not on a violation of his own constitutional rights, but on the ground
that the government must not be allowed to profit by its own wrong and thus encouraged in
the lawless enforcement of the law." Id. at 857. Martin was abrogated by a state constitu-
tional amendment, passed in 1982, which provides that "relevant evidence shall not be ex-
cluded in any criminal proceeding." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d); see also Wayne R. LaFave,
Being Frank About the Fourth: On Allen's "Process of 'Factualization' in the Search and
Seizure Cases," 85 MicH. L. REv. 427, 432 (1986).
81. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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society from such a value system is ominous. As Justice Brandeis ob-
served in 1927, "[i]f the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself;
it invites anarchy." S
Ultimately, this basis for exclusion was transformed into the "judicial
integrity" rationale in Elkins v. United States.83 However, the Elkins
Court construed Justice Brandeis's point too narrowly. The principle
enunciated by Brandeis does not mean merely that judicial integrity will
be compromised by the introduction of illegally obtained evidence. In-
stead, Brandeis implies a broader value: Law enforcement officials will
not profit from their violation of constitutional precepts. A corollary to
this value is that the judiciary should not condone such behavior and
thereby sully its hands in the process.
One might take issue with this explanation on the ground that gov-
ernmental overreaching, as noted, is not necessarily averted through the
exclusionary remedy. 4 Nevertheless, the principles undergirding the
criminal amendments support the notion that governmental abuse is not
tolerable and thus should not be sanctioned. In addition, the fair play
standards that pervade the adversary system militate against rewarding
constitutional violations.
As Professor Amsterdam points out, the prevailing view of the exclu-
sionary rule is shortsighted because it is grounded on an "atomistic con-
ception" of the Fourth Amendment.85 That is, the rule is viewed as a
means of deterring specific "episodes" of unconstitutional police con-
duct.86 The same point could be made about the rest of the criminal
amendments; that is, one must view them broadly as protecting values
that are more encompassing than individual autonomy. A system with-
out the exclusionary sanction might not necessarily multiply induce-
ments to violate the criminal amendments.' It would, however, create
the impression that constraints against unbridled discretion are
meaningless.
Paradoxically, the Court has identified this principle while simultane-
ously limiting the scope of the exclusionary rule. In Stone v. Powell,88
82. Id.
83. 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
84. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
85. Amsterdam, supra note 68, at 432.
86. ML
87. Professor Amsterdam reaches the opposite conclusion in justifying the exclusionary
rule. In his view, a system without the exclusionary rule "produces incentives to violate the
fourth amendment." Id. at 433.
88. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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the exclusionary remedy was circumscribed to preclude habeas corpus
relief when a state prisoner has had a "full and fair" litigation of a Fourth
Amendment claim in state court.8 9 In limiting the reach of exclusion,
however, the Powell majority acknowledged the lack of empirical foun-
dation for the deterrent effect of the exclusionary sanction. Neverthe-
less, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, recognized that attaching
sanctions to constitutional violations encourages law enforcement policy
makers "to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value
system." 90
In the Fifth Amendment context, the exclusionary remedy is built
into the text of the Constitution. As the Court has acknowledged, the
language of the Amendment "command[s] against the admission of com-
pelled testimony."91 In this respect, the language of the text provides a
definitive answer to an otherwise intricate dilemma. As discussed later,
the Court has managed to inject confusion into this area by applying the
deterrence rationale in construing the scope of the Miranda decision.92
The Supreme Court has also excluded evidence secured through a
Sixth Amendment violation.93 Although the text of the Sixth Amend-
ment does not prescribe the exclusionary sanction, the Court has re-
vealed a certain reluctance to invoke the remedy in this regard, and its
assessment of the objectives served by the Amendment suffers from seri-
ous doctrinal and logical flaws.94 We will revisit this issue later within
the context of discussing "prophylactic" remedies aimed at avoiding con-
stitutional violations.
Returning to the Fourth Amendment, the Court clearly has mani-
fested a distaste for applying the exclusionary rule. The Court has di-
luted the rule by adhering to a utilitarian calculus based on the cost of
excluding probative evidence versus the benefit derived from its exclu-
sion.95 In following this rationale, the Court has stressed the regulatory
function of the exclusionary remedy rather than individual rights. While
89. 1& at 481-82.
90. Id. at 492 (citing Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665, 756 (1970)).
91. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443 (1976).
92. See infra part II.B.
93. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967) (holding that postindictment
lineup identification obtained without presence of counsel is per se inadmissible); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967) (holding that excluding identification by witness
because postindictment lineup was conducted without counsel is violation of the Sixth
Amendment). Gilbert and Wade were the first two cases in which the Court applied the exclu-
sionary rule with respect to the Sixth Amendment.
94. See generally GAdciA, supra note 8.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984).
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emphasizing this regulatory perspective, however, the Court has further
restricted the exclusionary sanction through the "atomistic" rule of
"standing" to challenge the admission of illegally obtained evidence.
The standing requirement is based on the notion that constitutional
violations are "personal" and that evidence illegally seized is suppress-
ible only if the claimant's rights have been violated.96 Thus, this require-
ment contradicts the regulatory function behind the exclusionary
remedy. In effect, standing "operates in practice as a limitation on the
exclusionary rule ... [and] necessarily undermines the rule's regulatory
objectives." 97 Perhaps the most egregious example of the perverse re-
sults fostered by the standing limitation is United States v. Payner.98
Colloquially described as the "briefcase caper," Payner involved the
deliberate violation of the victim's Fourth Amendment constitutional
right to secure evidence against the target of the search. The unlawful
theft of the victim's briefcase was perpetrated willfully by the Internal
Revenue Service with the knowledge that the target of the search would
not be able to object to the introduction of the seized evidence because
he would lack standing to do so. 99
Reversing the lower courts' suppression of the evidence based on
their supervisory power to "suppress evidence tainted by gross illegali-
ties," the Supreme Court held that the deterrence rationale did not ex-
tend that far.100 In effect, the majority feared that suppression would
confer unbridled discretionary power on federal courts in applying the
exclusionary remedy.' 0 '
Payner demonstrates the poverty of the Court's exclusionary rule ju-
risprudence. Although Justice Powell, writing for the majority, acknowl-
edged the unconstitutional and "possibly criminal" behavior of the
government agents in this case, he was constrained by the fear that the
exclusionary sanction would open up a Pandora's Box. Moreover, his
conclusion that the deterrent effect of exclusion is counterbalanced by
the need to introduce the probative evidence is relegated to a footnote
and belies common sense.'0 Payner provides an open invitation to gov-
96. The classic rationale and statement of the standing requirement may be found in Al-
derman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-74 (1969).
97. Richard B. Kuhns, The Concept of Personal Aggrievement in Fourth Amendment
Standing Cases, 65 IowA L. REv. 493, 501 (1980).
98. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
99. Id. at 728-30.
100. Id. at 733.
101. Id. at 733-37.
102. Id. at 735 n.8.
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ernment agents steeped in the nuances of Fourth Amendment law to
trample upon the rights of innocent citizens with relative impunity.10 3
The Payner majority stressed the atomistic conception of the Fourth
Amendment to the detriment of its regulatory function. Had it empha-
sized the regulatory perspective, the majority would have suppressed the
evidence as a means of deterring such illegal behavior. Some would
claim that Payner reinforces the fact that the sole objective of the exclu-
sionary remedy is the regulatory one of deterring police misconduct.1°4
Viewed from a multifaceted perspective, however, Payner illustrates how
the exclusionary remedy safeguards the three fundamental values under-
lying the Fourth Amendment.
Not only did the search in Payner violate an innocent party's right to
privacy, it also encouraged lawless governmental behavior. Though the
evidence was not used against the aggrieved party, the government ac-
complished its goal: a conviction obtained through illegal means. Indi-
vidual, and potentially collective, privacy was compromised,
governmental overreaching was condoned, and fair play values were ig-
nored by the Payner Court's disregard of the fundamental values sus-
taining the Fourth Amendment.
It is useful to contrast this individualistic approach with the Court's
recent collective interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. In United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,05 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to an "extrater-
ritorial" search conducted against a defendant "with no voluntary at-
tachment to the United States." ' 6 Examining the text, history, and
scope of the Amendment, the Chief Justice underscored the collective
reference to the "people" in the text of the Amendment as signifying a
commitment to "protect the people of the United States against arbi-
trary action by their own [g]overnment."' 0 7 This regulatory function be-
ing the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment, it necessarily
103. Id. at 738 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It should be noted that the agents who con-
cocted this illegal activity were not prosecuted. Indeed, the only action by the government to
stem this activity was to suspend "Operation Tradewind" (the investigation that prompted the
"briefcase caper") and to issue guidelines designed to prevent such behavior. In fact, the
majority chastised the Internal Revenue Service for such "less than positive" measures. Id. at
733 n.5.
104. Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Un-
constitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MicH. L. Rnv.
907, 912-13 (1989).
105. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
106. Id. at 274-75.
107. Id. at 266.
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followed that the proscriptions embodied in the Amendment were never
intended to "restrain the actions of the [f]ederal [g]overnment against
aliens outside of the United States territory."'08
In his dissent, Justice Brennan underlined the regulatory role of the
Fourth Amendment, noting that the Bill of Rights forbids governmental
infringement of fundamental liberties and rights.10 9 Brennan believed
that, in prosecuting Verdugo-Urquidez, the United States ought to be
bound by its own charter or rules of the game.110
Comparing Payner with Verdugo-Urquidez evinces the Court's
flawed analysis of the norms underlying the Fourth Amendment and the
criminal amendments in general. In both circumstances, the govern-
ment's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. In Verdugo-Urquidez,
the government searched the defendant's property abroad without a
warrant and, arguably, without a reasonable basis for the search."' In
Payner, the governmental misconduct was even broader, extending to an
illegal search of an innocent party's briefcase. In both cases, the govern-
ment infringed upon individual and collective privacy, overstepped its
constitutional limitations, and offended fair process norms.
Ironically, the Payner decision rests on the atomistic concern for indi-
vidual rights embodied in the Fourth Amendment. Verdugo-Urquidez,
on the other hand, relies on a reading of the collective phrase "people,"
which protects the polity from governmental infringement of fundamen-
tal liberties. If the Court is faithful to its commitment to apply the exclu-
sionary remedy to encourage law enforcement officials "to incorporate
Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system,""' both Payner and
Verdugo-Urquidez represent inauspicious vehicles to attain the Court's
purported objective.
In this vein, the Court employed the Payner rationale in United States
v. Alvarez-Machain1 3 That case involved the forcible abduction of a
Mexican national to the United States with the full participation of Drug
Enforcement Administration Agents. Although Alvarez-Machain is
grounded on due process notions, the lesson one derives from it is simi-
lar to Payner's teachings. Indeed, the Alvarez-Machain majority rests its
holding on the formalistic conception that nothing explicit in the Extra-
dition Treaty between the United States and Mexico prevents the kid-
108. Id.
109. Id. at 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 284-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 294 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976).
113. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
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napping of foreign nationals.1 4 Although the majority had precedent to
establish that forcible abductions abroad did not deprive United States
courts of jurisdiction to try the defendant, Alvarez-Machain was differ-
ent from that precedent. Alvarez-Machain did not involve an abduction
by a private citizen nor the capture of an American fugitive within the
confines of U.S. territory; rather, it entailed the abduction by the U.S.
government of a foreign citizen on foreign soil in violation of Mexico's
territorial integrity. 5 Common sense dictates that Mexico did not con-
sent to forcible abduction of its citizens simply because it did not include
a provision prohibiting such a practice in its extradition treaty with the
United States. 16
Unmistakably, the message conveyed by the Court to law enforce-
ment officials in its recent Fourth Amendment exegesis is the following:
The criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights rest on formalistic distinc-
tions. While promoting adherence to fundamental constitutional values,
the Court simultaneously fosters their subversion by interpreting such
norms in a technical and contradictory fashion. A cynical interpretation
of the Court's jurisprudence would lead to the conclusion that the indi-
vidualistic and regulatory perspectives are alternatively employed to pre-
clude the application of the exclusionary sanction.
A different interpretation of the exclusionary remedy based on the
norms inherent in the Fourth Amendment would have prevented the
Court's slippery path. This method would take into account the inter-
ests of privacy, fairness, and protection from governmental abuse when
determining the scope of the exclusionary sanction. To the extent that
privacy values are the linchpin of the Fourth Amendment, they should
predominate in the balancing process. However, as we have seen, the
regulatory function is inextricably tied to the individual autonomy objec-
tive of the amendment. Finally, the fairness rationale questions whether
admission of the evidence should reward the government for its unlawful
behavior.
In each instance, the government engaged in a brazen violation of
individual autonomy. Since law enforcement agents suffered no retribu-
tion for their conduct, they received implicit authority to continue such
practices in the future. In fact, the police were taught not to internalize
Fourth Amendment norms, but rather to openly flout them. From a fair
play standpoint, the Court teaches that the ends (catching criminals)
114. Id. at 2194-97.
115. Id. at 2197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2199-203 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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may sometimes justify dubious means (kidnapping, breaking and enter-
ing, and dispensing with the warrant requirement).
If the values underlying the Fourth Amendment are to act as a guide,
then such ideals are portrayed as unnecessary luxuries when the Court
skirts their application. Indeed, the Court seems to be saying that, in
some circumstances, the standards promoted by the Fourth Amendment
are "unrealistic" or "extravagant." Thus, the Court seems to avoid its
own warning in Coolidge v. New Hampshire:117
In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or
fear of internal subversion, [the Fourth Amendment] and the val-
ues that it represents may appear unrealistic or "extravagant" to
some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamen-
tal constitutional concepts. In times not altogether unlike our
own they won.., a right of personal security against arbitrary
intrusions by official power. If times have changed, reducing ev-
eryman's scope to do as he pleases in an urban and industrial
world, the changes have made the values served by the Fourth
Amendment more, not less, important."8
B. Prophylactic Rules as a Way of Limiting Exclusion
Just as the Court has used its atomistic conception of the Fourth
Amendment as a way of blunting the impact of the exclusionary remedy,
it has described certain judicial doctrines as "prophylactics" in order to
avoid the "drastic" sanction of exclusion. The parallel here is striking:
the exclusionary rule is labeled a "judicially created" remedy designed to
prevent constitutional violations; similarly, the Miranda"9 decision and
other distasteful precedents are viewed as prophylactic devices that are
judicially created and therefore not constitutionally mandated. In turn,
"[w]hether or not a rule is prophylactic depends entirely on how the
Court describes the rule and its underlying rationale."' 2 ° As a conse-
quence, the Court gives short shrift to the values enshrined in both the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
While narrowing the reach of the exclusionary remedy through the
atomistic standing limitation, the Court also constrained the effect of Mi-
randa by putting the decision outside the constitutional ambit of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In Michigan v.
117. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
118. Id. at 455.
119. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
120. Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III
Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100, 111 (1986).
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Tucker,121 the Court held that the Miranda warnings, designed to deflect
the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation, are not constitution-
ally based. 22 Rather, as the Court explained later, "[t]he Miranda ex-
clusionary rule .. . serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in
the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation."'"
The parallels between the Court's treatment of the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary sanction and Miranda's exclusionary proscription are
striking. The prophylactic rationale undergirding Miranda is the deter-
rent value of averting a possible Fifth Amendment violation. Thus, in
the most prominent case circumscribing Miranda's impact, the Court fo-
cused on a cost-benefit, deterrent analysis in finding that a "public-
safety" exception to Miranda was warranted. 24
A significant flaw in this reasoning is that the Fifth Amendment is
"itself an exclusionary rule."' 25 Thus, deterrence of future violations is
irrelevant if one accepts Miranda as premised on the fundamental value
of freedom from self-incrimination. In essence, Miranda has become a
second-class citizen and, thus, is not subject to the exclusionary remedy
because, arguably, some statements taken in violation of Miranda are
not necessarily compelled.
This analysis fails to account for the values underlying the Miranda
opinion. Quite simply, Miranda is grounded on the three critical Fifth
Amendment values: individual dignity, a "fair state-individual balance,"
and freedom from governmental overreaching. 26 Rather than constrict-
ing its scope, the Court ought to recognize the obvious and overrule Mi-
randa. In essence, if the Court will not recognize the fundamental norms
supporting Miranda, then it should not hypocritically erode its
rationale. 127
Perhaps the Court implicitly acknowledges that Miranda might im-
bue police officers with a value system consistent with the Fifth Amend-
ment. Ironically, it has done so explicitly with respect to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary remedy."2 Nevertheless, the Court has an
121. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
122. Id. at 444. The majority stated that the Miranda warnings are prophylactic devices
and thus are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures
[designed] to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected." Id.
123. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
124. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
125. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443 (1976); Loewy, supra note 104, at 926.
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
127. Loewy, supra note 104, at 927-28.
128. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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odd way of attempting to command respect for the values inherent in the
criminal amendments. The message it seems to convey to law enforce-
ment agents is contradictory: adopt Fourth and Fifth Amendment ideals
as part of your "value system," but remember that there are always
means of avoiding those ideals when their application is either inconve-
nient or unpalatable.
Going beyond the confines of Miranda, a majority of the Court has
detracted from the autonomy values inherent in the Fifth Amendment
by holding that erroneously admitted coerced confessions are subject to
harmless error analysis. 129 The striking feature of Arizona v. Fulminante
is Chief Justice Rehnquist's discourse about the extent to which the
harmless error doctrine has been applied to constitutional violations in-
volving police misconduct. In distinguishing the application of the harm-
less error rule to trial errors from "structural defects" in the "mechanics"
of the trial, Chief Justice Rehnquist betrays a hostility toward the sup-
pression of coerced confessions. 30
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that in Fulminante the coercion
exerted was psychological, not physical.' 3' This fact somehow amelio-
rates the violation of the suspect's right to be free from governmentally
induced coercion. However, the Chief Justice, speaking for a bare ma-
jority, overlooked the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule, which is built
into the text of the Constitution and which definitively establishes the
proposition that coerced confessions are to be excluded from the trial
process. 32 Further, Fulminante's logic contradicts the Court's long-
standing practice of recognizing that psychological coercion, whether
subtle or blatant, contravenes Fifth Amendment norms. 33
129. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,295 (1991). In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18 (1967), the Court subscribed to the rule that a constitutional error does not require auto-
matic reversal of a conviction. Rather, such error might be deemed harmless if the admission
of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As Justice White noted in dissent
from the majority's application of the harmless error standard to coerced confessions, Chap-
man identified three constitutional errors that would not be classified as harmless: "using a
coerced confession against a defendant in a criminal trial, depriving a defendant of counsel,
and trying a defendant before a biased judge." Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 290 (White, J., dissent-
ing in part).
130. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.
131. Id. at 311.
132. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443 (1976); Loewy, supra note 104, at 926.
133. In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), for example, the Court determined that a
confession was involuntary when secured by a policeman who traded on his friendship with
the defendant to secure a confession. In that case, the policeman told the defendant that he
would get into trouble unless the defendant confessed. Id. at 318-19. Spano bears striking
factual parallels to Fulminante because in Fulminante the police agent relied on his "friend-
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In stripping Miranda from its constitutional moorings, the Court has
simultaneously ignored Fifth Amendment commands in Fulminante.
Similarly, the prophylactic methodology has infused Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence. Construing the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel
as a fundamental right in Gideon v. Wainwright,' the Court left no
doubt about the constitutional basis of the assistance of counsel. Yet,
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin135 implied
that the right to counsel is a prophylactic rule that safeguards the
broader right to a fair trial.136 This perspective is problematic because
the right to a fair trial is the goal behind the distinct provisions of the
Sixth Amendment. Therefore, it is counterintuitive to contend that dep-
rivation of counsel at trial is constitutional as long as the defendant re-
ceives a fair trial.137
Consistent with this philosophy, the Court has ignored its own prece-
dent in characterizing the rule set forth in Massiah v. United States13 as
merely prophylactic. In that case, the Court held that the government
could not secretly elicit incriminating statements from an indicted de-
fendant without the benefit of counsel.139 This prohibition rested on the
belief that the right to counsel safeguards a defendant who has been for-
mally charged with a crime by interposing counsel as a "medium" be-
tween the prosecution and the accused.14°
Massiah is predicated on a proper adversarial balance between the
prosecution and the defendant once the government has committed its
resources toward the prosecution of the defendant. The right to counsel
is viewed as the mechanism to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial.
The lawyer is seen as the protector of the accused when the accused is
"confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the
ship" with the defendant to offer Fulminante protection from retribution by other inmates.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 282-83.
134. 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
135. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
136. Id. at 52, 62 (Powell, J., concurring).
137. Grano, supra note 120, at 115-19.
138. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
139. Id. at 206.
140. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985). The Court had extended Massiah's
reach in both Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977). Both cases stand for the proposition that after the initiation of formal charges against
the accused, law enforcement personnel must deal with the accused through her counsel. The
rationale behind these cases is that, once the prosecution has committed itself to prosecute the
accused, the government's role has markedly changed, since its proper focus is accusatory
rather than investigatory. See GARCiA, supra note 8, at 20-27.
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public prosecutor.' 1 41 The inexorable logic behind this principle is that
when government's function has shifted from investigation to formal ac-
cusation, it has purportedly gathered sufficient evidence to prosecute the
accused. Therefore, the prosecution must deal with the accused through
counsel to secure the defendant's right to a fair adversarial process. 42
Nevertheless, the Court has qualified this principle through a formal-
istic perspective of its rationale. In Michigan v. Jackson,43 two suspects
invoked their right to counsel at their arraignment. Subsequently, they
were interrogated by detectives and confessed after executing a waiver
of their Miranda rights. Both the confessions and the waiver were nulli-
fied because the suspects had invoked their right to counsel after formal
proceedings against them had begun. 44 In Patterson v. Illinois,4 5 how-
ever, a majority of the Court relied on a stilted view of Jackson by hold-
ing that, regardless of whether formal prosecution had begun, law
enforcement could obtain a confession as long as the accused had not
asserted the right to counsel and executed a Miranda waiver. 46
Furthermore, the Court, in Michigan v. Harvey, 47 mislabeled the
Jackson rule, which adhered to the precept embodied in Massiah as a
"prophylactic" device. This erosion of Jackson's impact was compelled
by the notion that statements taken in violation of Jackson's "prophylac-
tic" rule are admissible to impeach a defendant's false or inconsistent
testimony at trial.'48 The right to counsel, therefore, rests on a formalis-
tic distinction: the accused's invocation of the assistance of counsel
when the adversary process begins. The Massiah rationale is now
grounded upon a thin reed, allowing the government to boost its case
even though it allegedly has amassed sufficient evidence to prosecute the
defendant. More important, it permits the prosecution to circumvent the
adversarial process by going behind defense counsel's back. 49
141. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973).
142. It should be noted that law enforcement is not precluded from continuing the investi-
gation of a defendant who has been formally charged with a crime. Rather, the government is
free to investigate the defendant with respect to crimes as to which the right to counsel has not
attached (i.e., as long as adversary proceedings have not begun against the defendant). More-
over, the government does not violate Massiah, even if adversary proceedings have begun, if it
does not deliberately elicit incriminating information from the suspect in the absence of coun-
sel. See, e.g., Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176.
143. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
144. Id. at 636.
145. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
146. Id. at 300.
147. 494 U.S. 344 (1990).
148. Id. at 1178.
149. GARCIA, supra note 8, at 26-27.
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Although the premises underlying Miranda may arguably be catego-
rized as "prophylactic," no justification exists for labeling the right to
counsel, defined and elaborated in Massiah, as a mere protective device.
As Professor Grano has pointed out, Justice Rehnquist erred in stating
that the Massiah rule "rests on a prophylactic application of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel that... entirely ignores the doctrinal foun-
dation of that right."'' 0 There is nothing prophylactic about the Massiah
doctrine. Rather, Massiah rests on a fundamental principle of the adver-
sarial process: Once the government has decided to formally prosecute
an individual, it must deal with the accused through counsel. Fair play
norms undergird this precept; the adversarial balance would be upset if
the government were given free reign to extract evidence from the de-
fendant without the assistance of an attorney.
What values is the Court seeking to advance through its use of the
prophylactic methodology? A skeptical observer would conclude that
the Court is using this device as a means of restricting the scope of the
exclusionary remedy. As a consequence, the lesson derived from the
Court's Miranda and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is a negative one:
Miranda is well-intentioned reform gone astray, and the right to counsel
is a technical, prophylactic remedy that is merely a means toward the
ultimate end of affording a criminal defendant a fair trial. Lost in the
translation are the values fostered by both Miranda and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel: an interest in individual and collective dig-
nity and autonomy, an attempt to curtail governmental abuses, and the
need to uphold fair play rules essential to the operation of the adver-
sarial system. Indeed, the Court's analysis skirts the essential values
that underlie both the Fifth Amendment's proscription against self-in-
crimination and the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel.
C. Multiple Constitutional Violations: The Intersection of the
Bill of Rights
The values underlying the criminal amendments intersect when po-
tential violations of multiple provisions of the Bill of Rights arise. When
150. Grano, supra note 120, at 122-23 (quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 289
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). Professor Grano, however, has changed his views on this
issue. He states that "[a]lthough I once defended the Court's application of the sixth amend-
ment to post-charge interrogations, I now have been persuaded that the application of the
sixth amendment in this context is constitutionally indefensible." Joseph D. Grano, Introduc-
tion-The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: The Contribu-
tion of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Policy, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 395, 410 n.70
(1989) (citing Joseph D. Grano, Police Interrogation and the Constitution: Doctrinal Tension
and Uncertain Future, 25 Cginm. L. BULL 5, 10 (1989)).
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illegally obtained evidence is admitted at trial, for whatever purpose, the
threat exists that other constitutional safeguards will be undermined.
Similarly, when a constitutional right is abridged, such as the right to
confront one's accusers, another constitutional provision might be
eroded, such as the right against self-incrimination. Moreover, from a
pragmatic standpoint, multiple constitutional violations threaten the
symmetry upon which the adversarial process is built.
Two prominent examples demonstrate the Court's failure to assess
the implications behind multiple violations: the impeachment exception
to the exclusionary rule' 5' and the tendency to equate the confrontation
clause with evidentiary principles. A brief examination of these doc-
trines will reveal how the values behind the criminal amendments inter-
sect in the "real world" of criminal law,' 52 and how the Court has
overlooked the manner in which these values converge.
The impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule allows the pros-
ecution to introduce illegally secured evidence to impeach the defend-
ant's testimony. First established by the Court in the case of Walder v.
United States,'53 the rule rests on the notion that the incremental value to
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is minimal when illegally
seized evidence is admitted to impeach the defendant's testimony. In
contrast, the truth-finding mission of the adversary system is undermined
when a defendant may rely on the exclusionary remedy as a "shield" to
commit perjury.' 54 Nevertheless, the Court has refused to extend the ex-
ception to cover defense witnesses; the exception applies only to the de-
fendant's own testimony. 55
Perhaps the best vehicle for analyzing the doctrine is the case of
United States v. Havens.'56 The defendant, along with a codefendant,
was charged with smuggling narcotics. The codefendant pleaded guilty
and testified against the defendant at trial. The codefendant had con-
cealed the narcotics in a T-shirt made with special pockets. The pockets
were made with patches cut from another T-shirt found in the defend-
ant's luggage. The defendant's luggage was seized illegally and was not
151. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
152. In Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), Justice Blackmun chided his brethren for ig-
noring the "significant realities that so often characterize a criminal case." Id. at 547-48
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
154. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1980). The Court employed this rea-
soning in decreeing exceptions to the Miranda rule in two cases decided in the 1970s: Oregon
v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
155. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
156. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
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admissible in the government's case-in-chief. When the defendant de-
nied possession of the T-shirts, the cut T-shirt, excluded because
Havens's luggage was seized without a warrant, was introduced as rebut-
tal evidence.1 57
Havens is important because the majority broadened the reach of the
impeachment exception. On previous occasions, the Court had limited
the exception to those instances in which illegal evidence contradicted
the defendant's testimony on direct examination.'58 In Havens, however,
the defendant referred neither to the incriminating T-shirt nor to con-
tents of his luggage during the course of the direct examination. Rather,
the testimony about the T-shirt emerged as a result of the prosecutor's
cross-examination of Havens. 5 9 The majority sought to distinguish
Havens on the shaky premise that the cross-examination about the T-
shirt and the luggage were closely tied to the gist of the direct examina-
tion. 60 In effect, Havens gives the prosecution a formidable weapon
with which to admit illegally seized evidence because "the prosecutor
can lay the predicate for admitting otherwise suppressible evidence with
his own questioning. 1 61 Thus the defendant potentially will be deterred
from testifying in his behalf due to the looming threat of the admission
of illegally seized evidence.' 62 This probability undermines three consti-
tutional provisions: the right to a fair adversary proceeding grounded in
157. Id. at 622-23.
158. In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), the Court barred the use of illegally
obtained evidence in an unrelated case because the defendant did not refer to the evidence
during the scope of direct examination. Moreover, the Court, quoting from Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), noted that the exclusionary rule dic-
tates that illegally seized evidence should not be used "at all"; that is, it saw the function of the
rule as precluding the introduction of illegally seized evidence for any purpose. Agnello, 269
U.S. at 35. Although the Court retreated from this categorical position in Walder, it still
cabined the exception to encompass the use of illegally secured evidence only when the evi-
dence contradicts a statement made by the defendant during the scope of direct examination.
159. Havens, 446 U.S. at 625.
160. Id. at 626.
161. Id. at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 632 (Brennan, J., dissenting). One could argue that this deterrence applies
only when the defendant and his lawyer "conclude that the costs of introducing the suppressed
proof outweigh the benefits of the favorable testimony." See James L. Kainen, The Impeach-
ment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules: Policies, Principles, and Politics, 44 STAN. L. REv.
1301, 1316 (1992). However, if the prosecutor feels that the evidence is crucial to obtaining a
conviction, as was apparently the case in Havens, the defendant and his counsel are apt to
conclude that the costs outweigh the benefits of the favorable testimony. Indeed, it is ques-
tionable whether the defendant would have chosen to testify in Havens had he and his counsel
known that the government would introduce the suppressed evidence. This conclusion is but-
tressed by the fact that counsel made sure not to bring up either the incriminating T-shirt or
the luggage during the course of Havens's direct examination.
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the right to due process; the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory pro-
cess, which by inference covers the defendant's right to testify on her
own behalf; and the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimina-
tion, which encompasses the obverse side of its safeguard-the right to
testify.16
3
The ramifications of Havens are more far-reaching than the limited
nature of the impeachment exception suggests. Although the illegally
obtained T-shirt arguably was used only to impeach the defendant's tes-
timony (brought up by the prosecutor's cross-examination), it was em-
ployed by the jury substantively. In essence, "the rebuttal of the
defendant's testimony could only have been based on the jury's belief in
the substantive truth of the fact that the altered T-shirt was used in the
smuggling, and that it belonged to the defendant."'" When a piece of
evidence critical to the government's case is suppressed, but is brought in
through the back door of impeachment, the likelihood that the jury will
not weigh it substantively in assessing the defendant's guilt is minuscule.
In this context, the Court's refusal to extend the parameters of the
impeachment exception in James v. Illinois 65 defies reason. The flawed
logic underlying James stems from the majority's attempt to distinguish
Havens because that case permits the admission of suppressed evidence
only when it "directly contradict[s]" the defendant's testimony. 66 As
the previous discussion illustrates, however, Havens did not involve self-
contradiction; rather, it permitted the prosecution to introduce the evi-
dence through cross-examination of the defendant as a means of estab-
lishing a predicate for admission.
What has the Court accomplished by broadening the impeachment
exception with regard to the defendant's testimony, besides limiting it by
not extending the rule to defense witnesses? First, it has undermined the
rationale behind the exception because its attempt to distinguish James
from Havens has failed. Second, and most important, the Court has sub-
sumed the values underlying the criminal amendments under evidentiary
concepts.167 In the search for "truth" within the adversary system, the
163. This was the Court's reasoning in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), in which it
held that the defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his behalf at trial.
164. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 324 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
165. 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
166. Id. at 314. Paradoxically, Justice Brennan, who wrote the dissent in Havens, wrote
the majority opinion in James and thus contradicted his previous stance in Havens.
167. See Kainen, supra note 162, at 1305, 1367. As Professor Kainen notes, the Court
operates under the false assumption that the "contradictory values reflected in constitutional
criminal procedure and evidentiary principles are susceptible to neutral accommodation." Id
at 1305.
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Court ignores the autonomy of the individual, the need to curb govern-
mental excesses, and the fairness that defines the adversary process.
Coinciding with this approach is the Court's failure to recognize the
divergence between the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
and the hearsay rule. Indeed, a majority of the Court has crafted a con-
clusive presumption that hearsay evidence complies with the Confronta-
tion Clause as long as it falls within a "firmly rooted" exception to the
rule.168 Again, the search for accuracy in fact-finding obscures the fair
play norms guaranteeing the defendant an adversarial proceeding and a
fair trial. The outer limits of this doctrine threaten to "revive" the trial
by affidavit that the Confrontation Clause was designed to prevent.169
Not only does the Court's tendency to equate the Confrontation
Clause and evidentiary law imperil Sixth Amendment values, it also un-
dermines the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination. 70
This proposition is evident in cases that construe the scope of the Bruton
doctrine.' 7 ' In Bruton, the Court held that the admission at trial of the
confession of a nontestifying codefendant that implicates the defendant
violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 72 De-
signing remedies, other than severance, that avert Bruton violations has
been a difficult task.
The most prominent example of the futility of this method is Richard-
son v. Marsh."7 That case involved the application of redaction as a rem-
edy for a potential Bruton violation. Redaction allegedly cures the
Bruton problem by deleting all references to the defendant from the co-
defendant's confession. This seemingly ideal solution evaporates when
the codefendant's confession, linked to other evidence introduced at
trial, implicates the defendant in the crime. This is precisely what oc-
curred in Marsh. All references to Marsh were excluded from her ab-
sent codefendant's confession, which was introduced at the defendant's
trial.174 Combined with the victim's testimony, however, the confession
showed that Marsh had the requisite intent to commit the crimes with
which she was charged.'75
168. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387
(1986); see also GARCIA, supra note 8, at 94-96.
169. Roger W. Kirst, The Procedural Dimension of the Confrontation Doctrine, 66 Nnn. L.
REv. 485, 488 (1987).
170. See GARCIA, supra note 8, at 96-98.
171. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
172. Id. at 126.
173. 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
174. Id. at 203.
175. Id. at 203-04.
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Marsh faced the stark dilemma of allowing the codefendant's confes-
sion derivatively linking her to the crime to stand unchallenged, or testi-
fying to rebut the incriminating nature of the confession and thereby
surrendering her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. 76 Significantly, the confession formed the linchpin of the prosecu-
tion's case, since it was the only evidence establishing the mens rea
required for a conviction.177 If Marsh was considering exercising her
right not to testify, that option was foreclosed through the admission of
her codefendant's confession.
In summary, both the impeachment exception to the exclusionary
rule and the Court's failed attempt to link evidentiary principles with the
Confrontation Clause yield the potential for multiple constitutional vio-
lations. With regard to the impeachment exception, a defendant could
be deterred from exercising his Fifth Amendment right to testify in his
behalf because of the introduction of evidence seized in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. Conversely, in the Bruton context, a defend-
ant might be forced to give up her right not to testify in order to com-
pensate for the inability to confront her most devastating accuser. The
values underlying the criminal amendments are sacrificed in the interests
of efficiency and accurate fact-finding.
IV. AN INTEGRATED VISION OF CRIMINAL RIGHTS
The previous section has shown that Justice Brennan's criticism of
the Court's "doctrinally destructive nihilism"178 was not the hyperbolic
reaction of a frustrated justice whose philosophy was overshadowed by
the changing composition of the Court. But how might Brennan and
scholars who have embraced his critique have fashioned a better argu-
ment against the majority's drift? More important, how could the Bur-
ger and Rehnquist Courts have justified some of their decisions that
were the object of intense criticism and scrutiny? Quite simply, the an-
swer lies in defining and applying the values underlying the criminal
amendments in a consistent, coherent, and holistic manner.
One must begin by recognizing the obvious: The Constitution, and
particularly the Bill of Rights, is an extremely fluid, open-textured docu-
ment.' 79 Moreover, as Justice White has explained, the "Constitution is
176. GARCIA, supra note 8, at 82-83, 96-97.
177. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 214-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
179. See generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Defi-
nition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 1057 (1990); Laurence H. Tribe, On Reading the Constitu-
tion, 1988 UTAH L. REv. 747.
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not a deed setting forth the precise metes and bounds of its subject mat-
ter; rather, it is a document announcing fundamental principles in value-
laden terms that leave ample scope for the exercise of normative judg-
ment by those charged with interpreting and applying it."' 0 The chal-
lenge lies in defining those values and in applying them in a consistent
manner. This is a formidable duty in light of the competing interests
fostered by the Constitution.'
Looking at the criminal amendments as a whole, one draws the con-
clusion that they principally advance libertarian, individualistic values
against overweening governmental power. As we have seen, however,
majoritarian concerns against governmental abuse and in promoting citi-
zen participation through the jury process form an integral part of the
criminal amendments.182 Defining the values that underlie the criminal
amendments is the first part of the analysis; weighing the importance of
those values against the countervailing public and governmental inter-
ests when applying the amendments is the second step in the process. 83
Three overriding values that are common to the criminal amend-
ments have been identified. These values, however, carry different em-
phases depending upon the particular amendment involved. For
example, the Fourth Amendment's main goal is to "safeguard the pri-
vacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by govern-
mental officials.""' Privacy in the Fourth Amendment context means
security, particularly in one's home, against unwarranted invasions by
governmental authorities. Thus, a majority of the Court has concluded
that the "personal" and "societal" values underlying the Fourth Amend-
ment do not extend protection to activities in "open fields."'85 Privacy is
not a commodity the Court, from a normative perspective, believes soci-
180. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,789
(1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2823 (1992).
181. Id. at 766-67. Professor Tribe identifies the competing "visions" as liberal individual-
ism versus civic republicanism, national supremacy versus states' rights, and positivism versus
natural law. See Tribe, supra note 179, at 765-66.
182. See supra part H.B-C.
183. This analysis is partially derived from Professor Faigman's analysis of the proper way
to accommodate individual rights and government interests. See David L. Faigman, Recon-
ciling Individual Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme
Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REv. 1521 (1992). Professor Faigman argues that values sustaining
individual liberty define the Constitution and that countervailing majoritarian values
predominate in applying the Constitution. Id. at 1529. Of course, my position differs from
Professor Faigman's because majoritarian values are part of the criminal amendments.
184. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
185. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-83 (1984).
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ety is willing to recognize with respect to open fields. On the other hand,
a majority of the Court is willing to extend protection to the curtilage
because it is intimately associated with the home.186
Privacy within the Fourth Amendment context also means protection
of one's liberty and property interests. As the paradigmatic case de-
lineating the scope of the Amendment shows, the Fourth Amendment
protects "people, not places."'" The right to personal security and
property interests are safeguarded through the Amendment's proscrip-
tion against unreasonable seizures.' 88 In emphatic terms, moreover, the
Court has recently stated that the Fourth Amendment protects property
interests, even when neither privacy nor liberty concerns are involved. 89
By contrast, other provisions within the criminal amendments protect
personal privacy against different types of governmental invasion. In-
deed, the Katz opinion acknowledged this fundamental precept. 90 For
example, the Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination
protects "a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and
proscribes state intrusion to exact self-condemnation."' 91 This privacy
value is different from the Fourth Amendment's because it protects the
inner being of the individual against governmental action that violates,
through either overt or subtle coercion, not only the right to be left alone
but also the "inner sanctum" of individual freedom.
The privacy interest that the Sixth Amendment fosters is also distinct
from that secured by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. That privacy
value emphasizes the autonomous values of dignity and self-determina-
tion by allowing the individual to determine his or her fate. The rights to
counsel, confrontation, compulsory process, speedy trial, and a jury trial
all underscore the dignitary values that both underlie and differentiate
our adversary system of adjudication from other methods of determining
guilt or innocence. Rather than protecting the "inner sanctum" of pri-
186. Id. at 180 n.11. The majority pointed out that the petitioners had not claimed that
the property searched was within the curtilage. Further, Justice Powell noted that the term
"open field" is a misnomer, since "an open field need be neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those
terms are used in common speech." Id. Thus, a wooded area would constitute an open field
under the majority's analysis.
187. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The Katz opinion gave a broad
definition of what constitutes "privacy" for Fourth Amendment purposes. First, the majority
noted that the Amendment was not absolute in that it only safeguards privacy "against certain
kinds of governmental intrusion." Id. at 350. At the same time, the Amendment supposedly
sweeps more broadly, thus protecting values other than privacy. Id.
188. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
189. Sodal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 543-45 (1992).
190. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 n.5.
191. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973).
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vate thoughts and feelings, or the security in one's home, property, or
person, the Sixth Amendment promotes self-actualized individuals who
control their own destiny when the powerful forces of the organized
state are arrayed against them.
In this respect, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive
fines and cruel and unusual punishment mirrors the autonomy values
championed by the Sixth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment auton-
omy interests, however, differ from the Sixth Amendment protections
because they are designed to prevent the government from abusing its
monopoly on the legal application of force. That is, while the Sixth
Amendment advances the fair play norms essential to the adversary sys-
tem, the Eighth Amendment circumscribes the potentially limitless
power of the government to use force in penalizing criminal behavior.
Therefore, the individual autonomy the Sixth Amendment promotes is
designed to curtail governmental abuses in the process of determining
guilt; the autonomy the Eighth Amendment fosters is devised to thwart
governmental abuse in meting out punishments for criminal violations.
Personal privacy differs depending on the interest sought to be pro-
tected. As the Katz Court observed, "Virtually every governmental ac-
tion interferes with personal privacy to some degree. The question in
each case is whether that interference violates a command of the United
States Constitution."''" The degree and severity of the privacy violation,
together with the specific type of protection against governmental intru-
sion the amendment at issue seeks to safeguard, should guide the analy-
sis of any given case.
In conjunction with this analysis, it is important to weigh the para-
mount value engendered by the adversary process-fair play. Fair play
should limit the kind, degree, and severity of the governmental intrusion.
Moreover, fair play norms play a role not only in the adjudicatory phase,
but also in the investigative and postadjudicatory stages. 93
To apply the foregoing approach, therefore, requires assessing the
particular value the amendment involved protects, the degree and sever-
ity of the governmental intrusion against that interest, and the impact of
the intrusion on the fair play precepts underlying the adversary system.
Balanced against this analysis of values is "the utility of the conduct as a
technique of law enforcement."' 94 The more intrusive the conduct, the
more likely the practice is to run afoul of the normative values protected
192. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 n.5.
193. See supra part H.C.
194. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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by the amendment. No matter how useful the conduct is to law enforce-
ment or public interests, those considerations should be subordinate to
the values inherent in the criminal amendments if the governmental
practice severely encroaches upon privacy and fair play norms.
The best way to illustrate this analysis is to compare two cases that
have received harsh criticism from scholars and commentators as exam-
ples of the Court's failed jurisprudence: United States v. Payner195 and
United States v. Leon.'96 Although both cases deal with the Fourth
Amendment, they are representative of the Court's and the legal acad-
emy's failure to account for fundamental values when determining the
scope of the criminal amendments.
Payner demonstrates the flaws associated with a value-less approach
toward the Fourth Amendment. Payner involved the flagrant violation
of Fourth Amendment privacy norms. 97 The government infringed
upon the individual and collective privacy right to security in one's home
and private effects. Moreover, the government profited from the viola-
tion through the admission of the evidence. Thus, not only was the se-
curity of the bank president's home breached, but so was his interest in
the privacy of the contents of his briefcase. This was done without the
protection of a search warrant, which was designed to prevent the very
abuse perpetrated by government agents in Payner.
Rather than hiding behind the shield furnished by the "standing"
doctrine, the Court should have recognized the degree and severity of
the governmental intrusion and suppressed the evidence. However use-
ful the conduct was as a "technique of law enforcement," it encouraged
the type of violation against personal and property security that the
Fourth Amendment was intended to protect. It is hard to discern a more
blatant instance of governmental overreaching than the Payner scenario.
The introduction of the evidence flouted the fair play precepts underly-
ing the criminal amendments by allowing the government to use the law
as a means of effecting an egregious violation of privacy rights. In short,
the government had no justification for its violation of an innocent
party's constitutionally derived privacy rights.
On the other hand, the Court seemed to have missed an opportunity
for defending the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule in
Leon. The majority's reliance upon a cost-benefit, deterrence approach
to the exclusionary rule was subject to instant criticism. Not only is de-
195. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
196. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
197. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
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terrence difficult to prove from an empirical perspective, 198 but the costs
due to the suppression of evidence in cases when police secure a warrant
but make objectively reasonable mistakes with respect to probable cause
are negligible. 99
Leon is defensible from a value perspective because it involved mini-
mal, if not nonexistent, breaches of privacy values. The irony behind
Leon, and its companion case Massachusetts v. Sheppard, °0  was suc-
cinctly explained by Justice Stevens: "It is... disturbing that the Court
chooses one case [Sheppard] in which there was no violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and another [Leon] in which there is grave doubt
on the question, in order to promulgate a 'good faith' exception to the
... exclusionary rule."2 01
Governmental authorities complied with every dictate set forth in the
Fourth Amendment in Leon. They sought a warrant based on what they
believed to be probable cause to find evidence of drug transactions. The
search warrant was specific and authorized police officers to search with-
out giving the authorities the license of a general warrant that the Fourth
Amendment was designed to prevent.20 2 The probable cause issue in
Leon was allegedly "close." In light of the relaxed probable cause stan-
dard set forth in Illinois v. Gates,20 3 one could conclude that the Leon
warrant complied with the Fourth Amendment.2°4
Even if one does not reach this conclusion, the violation of privacy
rights in Leon was minimal compared to the flagrant privacy breach
committed in Payner. Moreover, no governmental overreaching oc-
curred in Leon. Justice Brennan's dissent takes pain to point out that
the police officers in that case acted with admirable "self-restraint. '20 5
Thus, the privacy infringement in Leon was arguably minimal given the
degree and lack of severity of the intrusion; governmental overreaching
was nonexistent; and the government did not, as in Payner, profit from
its own wrong. From a fair play viewpoint, therefore, the admission of
the evidence in Leon is much more justified and defensible than it is in
Payner. Furthermore, the utility of the government's conduct as a means
198. See supra part ll.A.
199. Leon, 468 U.S. at 951 (Brennan, 3., dissenting).
200. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
201. Leon, 468 U.S. at 962 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 971-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). That standard requires that the magistrate make a "common
sense" decision that "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place." Id. at 238.
204. Leon, 468 U.S. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 948 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of furthering law enforcement interests is more than marginally greater
in Leon than it is in Payner.
V. CONCLUSION
How can the debate over criminal procedure emerge from its current
state of stagnation? Have the "liberals" resigned themselves to defeat by
acknowledging that it is impossible to make substantive inroads in the
area? 06 Are the "conservatives" fearful that a new administration
might have the opportunity to alter the Court's drift through new ap-
pointments? Whatever the ideological and philosophical predispositions
may dictate, an analysis of the field of criminal procedure demands a
return to a value-laden, rather than a value-less, approach to constitu-
tional adjudication. Further, a holistic viewpoint is critical to constitu-
tional analysis. The criminal amendments promote common values and
ought not be viewed in isolation.
The time has arrived for a new perspective on criminal procedural
rights. It is not enough to critique the doctrinal "nihilism" of the Court
or to identify the internal or external inconsistency permeating the crimi-
nal procedure jurisprudence. Instead, the Court and the legal academy
ought to return to the rudimentary values that undergird the criminal
amendments.
206. See MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITu-
TIONAL LAW 2 n.5 (1988).
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